Has the approach of summer dissipated the war fever of the spring? Or, are we going through the same twists and turns that marked the inevitable movement towards the war in Iraq? Consider this article from today's Washington Post. By publishing it, the Post implicitly concedes that US policy towards Iran has been regime change, as well as raising a number of other interesting questions:

Just after the lightning takeover of Baghdad by U.S. forces three years ago, an unusual two-page document spewed out of a fax machine at the Near East bureau of the State Department. It was a proposal from Iran for a broad dialogue with the United States, and the fax suggested everything was on the table -- including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups.

But top Bush administration officials, convinced the Iranian government was on the verge of collapse, belittled the initiative. Instead, they formally complained to the Swiss ambassador who had sent the fax with a cover letter certifying it as a genuine proposal supported by key power centers in Iran, former administration officials said.

Last month, the Bush administration abruptly shifted policy and agreed to join talks previously led by European countries over Iran's nuclear program. But several former administration officials say the United States missed an opportunity in 2003 at a time when American strength seemed at its height -- and Iran did not have a functioning nuclear program or a gusher of oil revenue from soaring energy demand.

The Iranian proposal was detailed and substantive:

The document lists a series of Iranian aims for the talks, such as ending sanctions, full access to peaceful nuclear technology and a recognition of its "legitimate security interests." Iran agreed to put a series of U.S. aims on the agenda, including full cooperation on nuclear safeguards, "decisive action" against terrorists, coordination in Iraq, ending "material support" for Palestinian militias and accepting the Saudi initiative for a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The document also laid out an agenda for negotiations, with possible steps to be achieved at a first meeting and the development of negotiating road maps on disarmament, terrorism and economic cooperation.

Of course, many of you have probably already seen this story elsewhere, Gareth Prather broke it, I believe, but the essential aspect of this story is the Post confirms it and considers it newsworthy. Perhaps, this is grounds for optimism, reason to expect less credulous coverage of the administration's war plans, but I doubt it. More importantly, the Post article also suggests that there has been a fundamental change in administration policy, a rejection of the military option in favor of negotiations, and this could be true, if only because of the inability to obtain support from the Russians and the Chinese.

M. K. Bhadrakumar, a retired Indian diplomat, highlights the Catch-22 facing the administration:

The US officials claimed that having now made the offer to talk to Iran, Washington had a right to expect reciprocal Russian and Chinese support if the talks did not proceed with Iran, and the nuclear issue was thrown back to the court of the United Nations Security Council.

According to the New York Times, "Three senior officials said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because they were describing internal debates in the White House, he [Bush] made the final decision only after telephone calls with President Vladimir Putin of Russia and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany led him to conclude that if Tehran refused to suspend its enrichment of uranium, or later dragged its feet, they would support an escalating series of sanctions against Iran at the United Nations that could lead to a confrontation."

But that wasn't how the Russian Foreign Ministry seemed to view the events. According to a Russian statement on Thursday, while Moscow welcomed the US side's announcement on its readiness to hold direct talks with Iran, such talks were "long overdue" and "there is no reasonable alternative" to talks and negotiations.

Furthermore, Moscow saw the US decision to normalize relations with Iran in terms of a cessation of the "crisis state" in US-Iran relations, which was not serving the interests of the two peoples. Moscow felt that the normalization of US-Iranian ties would "benefit regional and international stability" and help resolve "other crisis situations in the region" (read Iraq).

Putin, too, welcomed the US decision and called it "an important step". So where is the question of Moscow reciprocating Bush's decision? This brings us to a crucial point. Indeed, what happens if Iran refuses to give up its uranium-enrichment activity?

Indeed, what should happen? The non-aligned movement expressed its opinion this week at the International Atomic Energy Agency:

[Iranian] Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki here Sunday in a meeting with Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Mohamed Benaissa said that developing and Islamic states should access high technology and declared support for their relevant right.

According to a report released by the Foreign Ministry's Media Department, at the meeting the two ministers discussed the latest developments in bilateral ties as well as regional and international issue.

Turning to the recent statement issued by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) member states in support of Iran's right to access nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, Mottaki said that it reflects the actual reaction of the world community to Iran's nuclear right.

He said, "As a member of NPT for the past 36 years, Iran has complied with its commitments. Now it attempts to gain its right and privilege of such membership.

With much of the world in addition to the Chinese and the Russians refusing to support the imposition of sanctions against Iran as a pathway to war, it would appear that the neoconservatives have failed, especially when one considers increasing global hostility towards the US and the economic consequences of it It remains, too early to tell, however, as Jorge Hirsch warns:

. . the sole purpose of the current US "soft" diplomatic activity is to induce Iran to "suspend their enrichment in a verifiable way." What for?

There is no security risk to the United States nor anybody else if Iran runs 164 P1 centrifuges. It would take 28 years for that equipment to make sufficient enriched uranium for a single bomb. Why then the precondition that Iran needs to stop this activity for the US to even start talking? Why isn't this one of the many issues that could be addressed during the actual talks?

"The suspension of all enrichment-related activity is at the core of what the international community is asking Iran to do." Why?

Because this is in all likelyhood the beginning and the end of the US diplomatic involvement with Iran. Once Iran stops enriching and the IAEA places its seals, the tripwire is in place. The split-second Iran breaks those seals again, the US cruise missiles will be launched. It will be almost hard wired, certainly at least in the minds of the decisionmakers.

Israel refuses to be the trigger. The US needs a trigger to start the bombing. This will be the line in the sand.

Unfortunately, Hirsch's analysis is all too persuasive when considered in light of how Bush proceeded to move towards war against Iraq. Unlike the war in Iraq, however, or, more accurately, because of it, Russian and Chinese opposition is intransigent, as addressed by Michael Klare in this excellent article:

Given what is at stake, it is easy to see why the United States, Russia and China all have such an abiding interest in the outcome of the Iranian crisis. For Washington, the replacement of the clerical government in Tehran with a US-friendly regime would represent a colossal, threefold accomplishment: it would eliminate a major threat to America's continued dominance of the Persian Gulf, open up the world's No 2 oil-and-gas supplier to US energy firms, and greatly diminish Chinese and Russian influence in the greater Gulf region.

From a geopolitical perspective, there could be no greater win on the global chessboard today. Even if Washington failed to achieve regime change but, using its military might, crippled Iran's nuclear establishment without sustaining major damage itself in Iraq or elsewhere, this would still be a significant geopolitical win, exposing the inability of either Russia or China to counter US moves of this sort. (This would only work, of course, if the Bush administration were able to contain the inevitable fallout from such action, whether increased ethnic strife in Iraq or a sharp spike in oil prices.

Not surprisingly, Moscow and Beijing are doing everything in their power to prevent any US geopolitical triumph in Iran or Central Asia from occurring, though without provoking an outright breach in relations with Washington - and so endangering complex economic ties with the United States.

Irresistable forces directed towards immovable objects. If the US unleashes the Pentagon against Iran, there is the prospect that the world could be rapidly transformed, with striking, unanticipated results, much as it was during major confrontations in the 19th and 20th centuries. Only the neoconservatives are insular enough and arrogant enough to confidently believe that such changes will be favorable to the US.

Labels: American Empire, Israel, Mainstream Media, NPT, United Nations, War with Iran