On Wednesday morning, I awoke in a hotel room down valley from Sacramento. I was there on work-related business, and, unlike at home, I had the full array of cable channels. I have encounters with cable news programming infrequently, and I am invariably startled by what constitutes news, and how it is manipulated. As I surfed, the political theme of the day was consistent: the Iraq Study Group report.

The coverage was designed to obscure the obvious. The authors of the report don't say anything that we haven't already been told repeatedly, make absurd policy suggestions and delay the day of reckoning until the end of the Bush presidency. Typical of some government bureaucracies, especially when confronted with a difficult problem, they ineptly concealed the lack of substance by substituting volume, as if presenting 79 proposals provides a greater chance of success than 15.

One of my friends astutely observed that the grim facial appearances and body language of the panel members spoke more candidly than the content of the report, and they spoke with one voice. As many on the left recognized a long time ago, the war in Iraq is lost. While there is an unavoidable tastelessness in the comparison, I couldn't help thinking that this is what it would have been like if Hitler had commissioned an Eastern Front Study Group in the late summer of 1943. Lots of superficially plausible ideas to avoid telling the unpalatable truth.

We can even imagine similar proposals (there is a need for more people capable of speaking Slavic languages and civilian Reich employees should be ordered to Russia as required), with an equally contentious debate, centered around, in this instance, whether negotiations should be opened with the US and Britain to bring about pan-European solution. Hard liners, invoking Goebbels' "total war" speech at the Sportspalast, insist that victory must be achieved, without defining it as an attainable objective. A careful examination of the report reveals that there was not much of an effort to solicit the opinion of Russians.

But I have begun to digress. Not only is the war lost, but the solicitation and issuance of the report is indicative of a political system in paralysis. Neither political party can acknowledge the enormity of the defeat in Iraq, and the prospect of a military catastrophe looming over the horizon. So, Bush and his Republican supporters describe the occupation within the context of a global "war on terror", whereby each suicide bomber, each militia raid and each US airstrike reflects the overall success of the operation.

Conversely, Democrats embrace the ISG report because it is consistent with their tendency to transform the occupation into a matter of effective administration so as to avoid more and more insistent public demands for withdrawal of the troops. If we could just get the stakeholders together, reach consensus, and deliver more pens, writing pads, cell phones and Blackberries to the right people, then the Iraqis will forget their hatred of the occupation. And, of course, the parties should be hastened along towards reaching consensus by making the release of funds to the Iraqi government conditional upon the completion of "benchmarks".

Hence, the carrot and stick approach commonly associated with local government planning disputes has been embraced as a means of resolving one of the most violent, intractable conflicts of our lives. Given that many congressional representatives started their careers as mayors, council members and supervisors, we shouldn't be surprised that they are reflexively falling back upon this familiar method. If done effectively, it coerces consent, thus enabling politicians to avoid being associated too strongly with any advocate. Furthermore, the disappointments of 2005 and 2006 have made the punitive aspects of this dispute resolution technique popular, if only as a way of pandering to Americans displeased with the numerous dead and wounded soldiers sent stateside every month.

Accordingly, the ISG proposals are increasingly being embued with talismanic qualities. As with the 9/11 report (yes, a report that exposed the country's political dysfunctionality as it existed prior to the invasion of Iraq), it must be adopted in its entirety. Piecemeal adoption of ISG proposals will fail. Of course, this is very convenient, as there is no chance that all of the proposals will be adopted and implemented, so it permits congressional proponents, predominately Democrats, to exploit the report for political advantage, while continuing to support the occupation as a grim necessity.

The congressional elections and the ISG report therefore expose the bankruptcy of the liberal strategy that emphasizes the need to recover power within the government, to the exclusion of social alternatives, as a means of ending the occupation of Iraq. It is a game rigged against anyone who wants to radically change the imperialistic imperatives of US foreign policy. Credibility is measured by whether there are former generals, former State Department officials and so-called "terrorism experts" willing to intellectually buttress a less interventionist philosophy, and few are willing to do so. Indeed, there is a Catch-22 here, whereby any highly respected figure who publicly advocates for such a policy loses credibility as a consequence of a a coordinated governmental and media assault.

If public pressure builds, an entity like the ISG is created, consisting of an appointed group of Wise Men and Wise Women, people who understand that it is their responsibility to put their prestige at the service of preserving the existing order. They produce a report that presents the appearance of an alternative, an appearance of political disagreement, when, in fact, they have worked assidously to ensure that US troops will remain in Iraq indefinitely. The report, as already discussed, also enables politicians to appear to oppose the occupation, while the withdrawal of US troops remains subject to the attainment of impossible goals.

Meanwhile, the Iraqis continue to resist and struggle to create a strong coalition against the US presence. As the US political system has, yet again, shown itself incapable of ending this conflict, it is left to them to do so by driving US troops out of the country. It will happen, it is only a matter of time, and the only question is how quickly they will accomplish it. One suspects that the answer will render the conclusions of the ISG report, especially in regard to the withdrawal of US troops, an embarassment. But it won't matter. It will have already served its purpose.

Labels: Democrats, Iraq Study Group, Neoconservatives, Occupation of Iraq

There's been a lot of talk lately about what James Baker's Iraq Study Group is going to mean for Iraq policy. I think we can get a glimpse of things to come by taking a look at what's been going on with the US's other war.

Earlier this month, Pakistan cut a peace deal with the Taliban: Pakistan agreed to withdraw troops from the Afghanistan border and freed hundreds of prisoners in exchange for pro-Taliban tribal militias promising to stop attacking the Pakistani army and to reframe from entering Afghanistan. The peace deal was widely criticized in the US and British press. The CSM quoted an unnamed source who called the agreement "a total capitulation" by Islamabad. The Times described it as a "face-saving retreat for the Pakistani Army" and "one of the most obvious capitulations since it began its campaign to rout foreign fighters from [North Waziristan]" that has "in effect ceded the militants a sanctuary in the area." The Post quoted an "official at an international agency" as follows:

This could be a very dangerous development. [...] Until recently there has been relative stability in eastern Afghanistan, but now that could start to deteriorate.

In this context, last week, British Gen. David Richards, commander of NATO forces, met with President Musharraf, and the pre-meeting spin, particularly in the British press, played up the meeting as an attempt by NATO to rein in or otherwise chastise Pakistan. A Guardian piece titled "Musharraf faces new questions over Taliban" noted that the meeting followed "a string of accusations, some from within Nato, that Pakistan [had] failed to close down Taliban sanctuaries in the northern tribal belt, and that elements within its [intelligence] agency may be assisting the insurgency", and an article in the Sunday Times openly referred to the meeting as a "confrontation". Rumor had it that Richards was going present Musharraf with an address in Quetta where Mullah Omar could be found and demand his arrest.

But this showdown never came to pass. In fact the Australian press reported that the much-maligned Pakistan-Taliban peace deal might actually be a "blueprint for a possible [NATO] accord with the Taliban in Afghanistan":

[F]ar from criticising General Musharraf, it appears the Pakistani leader's deal with Taliban-supporting tribal militants in the North Waziristan district of the North West Frontier Province could form the basis of an accord aimed at ending the insurgency and bringing the Taliban into the Government in Kabul.

From General Musharraf down, senior Pakistani officials are insisting that NATO is now supporting Islamabad's bid to reach a peace accord with the Taliban. Reports in New Delhi quoted General Richards as supporting the agreement with the Taliban in North Waziristan, saying it could set an example of how best to deal with such problems

Dealing with questions about the previous frame, that NATO displeasure with Pakistan forced Richards to confront Musharraf, Richards in a briefing yesterday claimed that the British press simply had the story wrong:

[...]I was really angry about that report [in the Sunday Times] And I have to say, the journalist in question, and not many of you will know this, was really angry too, because they talked about me going to confront the Pakistanis, and nothing could be further from the truth. And I have actually had an apology from the Sunday Times journalist because she was so angry. [ ... ] And I did have to explain early on to the Pakistanis that I was not going in a confrontational mood or mode, because both having had long discussions with President Karzai before I went, and with my own political leaders in NATO, that we are in this together. Pakistan and Afghanistan, who do have differing interpretations over what is happening here in terms of the insurgency, are quite clear that they've got to solve it together as a team, and that is the essence of the Tripartite Commission. And that is the spirit with which I went to Pakistan. I was very-well received.

which is all fine and good, but not very credible. That Richards went to Pakistan to scold Musharraf may well be false, fine -- but the reports that there were voices within NATO accusing Pakistan of refusing to defend its border with Afghanistan are a matter of the public record; that is, I don't think the Sunday Times was manufacturing quotations.

This whole story seems a lot like what may be about to happen in Iraq. One of the most controversial policy option Baker and the boys are supposed to be considering is the so-called "Iran-Syria plan" in which the US would attempt to cut some sort of deal with Iran and Syria in order to stabilize Iraq. Looks like the plan is already being implemented ... in Afghanistan.

Labels: Iran, Iraq Study Group, Pakistan, Syria, War with Iran