On the ground, things are not going well for the US and its Iraqi surrogates:

. . . American aircraft launched air strikes in Basra yesterday and fought militiamen on the streets in Baghdad while British advisers have also been assisting Iraqi troops in Basra.

Mr Maliki retreated from his demand that militiamen hand over their weapons by yesterday and extended the deadline to 8 April. This is a tacit admission that the Iraqi army and police have failed to oust the Mehdi Army from any of its strongholds in the capital and in southern Iraq. The Iraqi army has either met stubborn resistance from Mehdi Army fighters or soldiers and police have refused to fight or changed sides. "We did not expect the fight to be this intense," said the officer from a 300-strong commando unit that has been pinned down in the Tamimiyah district in Basra, where the supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Mehdi Army, have strong support.

The officer said four of his men were killed and 15 wounded in the fighting. "Some of the men told me that they did not want to go back to the fight until they have better support and more protection," he added. The Interior Ministry threatened that the men would be court-martialled for refusing to fight. Government troops arriving in Basra complain that they are being fired on by local police loyal to Mr Sadr. Members of one police unit had fist fights with their officers after they refused to join the battle.

The failure of Mr Maliki to make good his threat so far to eliminate the Mehdi Army and growing signs of dissent in army units is damaging his authority, "It is possible that Muqtada and the Mehdi Army will emerge from this crisis stronger than they were before," warned one Iraqi politician who did not want his name published.

According to CNN:

A closely held U.S. military intelligence analysis of the fighting in Basra shows that Iraqi security forces control less than a quarter of the city, according to officials in both the United States and Iraq, and Basra's police units are deeply infiltrated by members of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army.

Meanwhile, elsewhere:

A Reuters reporter in Nassiriya, capital of Dhi Qar province, said he could see groups of fighters with machineguns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The sound of sporadic gunfire echoed through the streets. Police appeared to be staying in their stations, he said.

Militants have also taken control of the town of Shatra, 40 km to the north, he said, citing witnesses.

Why are the US and the Maliki government attacking Sadr now? Perhaps, the effort to pass and implement an oil law friendly to transnationals has something to do with it? Sadr, as you might have guessed, opposes it because he believes that it would reward the US and the British for the invasion and occupation by directing contracts to US and British oil companies.

Labels: American Empire, Muqtada al-Sadr, Neoliberalism, Occupation of Iraq

The smaller devil has gone but the bigger devil has come

Labels: American Empire, Muqtada al-Sadr, Occupation of Iraq

From tomorrow's Independent, an article by Patrick Cockburn:

The Iraqi army's offensive against the Shia militia of the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in Basra is failing to make significant headway despite a pledge by the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to fight "to the end".

Instead of being a show of strength, the government's stalled assault is demonstrating its shaky authority over much of Baghdad and southern Iraq. As the situation spins out of Mr Maliki's control, saboteurs blew up one of the two main oil export pipelines near Basra, cutting by a third crude exports from the oilfields around the city. The international price of oil jumped immediately by $1 a barrel before falling back.

In Baghdad, tens of thousands of supporters of Mr Sadr, whose base of support is the Shia poor, marched through the streets shouting slogans demanding that Mr Maliki's government be overthrown. "We demand the downfall of the Maliki government," said one of the marchers, Hussein Abu Ali. "It does not represent the people. It represents Bush and Cheney."

The main bastion of the Sadrist movement is impoverished Sadr City, which has a population of two million and is almost a twin city to Baghdad. The densely packed slum has been sealed off by US troops. "We are trapped in our homes with no water or electricity since yesterday," said a resident called Mohammed. "We can't bathe our children or wash our clothes."

The streets are controlled by Mehdi Army fighters, many of whom say they expect an all-out American attack, though this seems unlikely since the US says that an attack on the Shia militias is a wholly Iraqi affair.

In Basra, Iraqi forces have cordoned off seven districts but appear stalled in their effort to dislodge the Mehdi Army fighters. Masked gunmen in some cases have captured or seized abandoned Iraqi army vehicles and painted pro-Sadrist slogans on their armour.

The surge was a qualified public relations success, as long as the US armed and paid Sunni insurgents to fight al-Qaeda, and honored a unilateral cease fire called by Muqtada al-Sadr. A contemporary instance of phony war. Now, the magician's trick has been revealed. The prospects do not look promising, as there are already reports of police defections and Iraqi troops refusing to fight.

Hat tip to Lenin's Tomb and Missing Links.

Labels: American Empire, Muqtada al-Sadr, Occupation of Iraq

Seumas Milne has published an important article about the nature of the Iraqi resistance to the US occupation:

"We are the only resistance movement in modern history that has received no help or support from any other country," Omary declares. "The reason is that we are fighting America." The 1920 Revolution Brigades spokesman is an articulate and sophisticated operator, who - if he survives the counterinsurgency and sectarian onslaught - clearly has the potential to become an influential voice in a future Iraq. "Our position is that there are two kinds of people in Iraq: not Sunni and Shia, Kurdish and Arab, Muslim and Christian, but those who are with the occupation and those who are against it." Anyone who takes part in the institutions set up by the occupation, such as the government and parliament, army or police, are regarded as collaborators. "Our organisation began its operations in the first days after the invasion and wherever you find the occupation, you will find us: from Mosul, Baghdad and Samarra to Basra, Hillah and Kirkuk," continues Omary. "Our group has also carried out attacks on British forces in Basra." They are not a Sunni sectarian organisation, he insists: "The military leader of the Brigades is a Kurd. Iraq is for all Iraqis and we only distinguish between those who cooperate with the occupation and those who do not. If my brother cooperates with the occupation, I will kill him - but the innocent must not be touched."

What makes Iraqis join the resistance? "Many people come to the resistance because of their Islamic background, some because of what has happened to their relatives at the hands of the occupation armies," says Zubeidy. "American forces have committed very big crimes against the Iraqi people. All Iraqis hate the foreign forces and won't forget what they have done. Generally, British forces have acted as a helper to the US and the British government shares the blame for everything that happened to Iraq. But their actions are seen as having been less cruel than the Americans."

At the heart of the new insurgent alliance is a rejection of the murderous sectarianism that has come to grip Iraq - and the role of al-Qaida in particular. Most striking is the case of Zubeidy, whose hardline salafist (purist Islamic) group Ansar al-Sunna recently split in half over the issue (his faction is now called the Legitimate Committee of Ansar al-Sunna - Goure says such splits are endemic in the resistance movement). "We wanted to unite with other resistance forces, but the other group is moving closer to al-Qaida and refused. Al-Qaida has brought benefits and problems," Zubeidy says. "They attack the US occupiers. But every day the problems they bring become greater than the benefits.

"Resistance isn't just about killing Americans without any aims or goals," he continues. "Our people have come to hate al-Qaida, which gives the impression to the outside world that the resistance in Iraq are terrorists. Suicide bombing is not the best way to fight because it kills innocent civilians. We are against indiscriminate killing - fighting should be concentrated only on the enemy. They [al-Qaida] believe that all Shia are kuffar [unbelievers] - and most of the Sunnis as well." They estimate that al-Qaida now carries out between a fifth and a third of all attacks in Iraq.

But they say that it is necessary for the Sunni-based groups to ally with the Shia. "Even though that is not easy," says Zubeidy. "A great gap has opened up between Sunni and Shia under the occupation and al-Qaida has contributed to that - as have the US and Iran. Most of al-Qaida's members are Iraqis but its leaders are mostly foreigners. The Americans magnify their role, even though they are responsible for a minority of resistance operations - remember that the Americans brought al-Qaida to Iraq."

If US troops remain in Iraq because of the threat of al-Qaeda, then the US can work with these people, and, according to some news accounts, has already done so. If the US also remains in Iraq in order to achieve the imperial aims of permanently stationing troops there, while exploiting the country's oil resources on terms favorable to transnationals, then, the violence will persist, if not intensify.

Meanwhile, Moqtada al-Sadr continues to reach out to the Sunni resistance in order to create a coalition that will render the occupation untenable:

Nationalist Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's bid to unite Sunnis and Shiites on the basis of a common demand for withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces, reported last weekend by the Washington Post's Sudarsan Raghavan, seems likely to get a positive response from Sunni armed resistance.

An account given Pentagon officials by a military officer recently returned from Iraq suggests that Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province, who have generally reflected the views of the Sunni armed resistance there, are open to working with Sadr.

A commander of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Abu Aja Naemi, confirmed to Raghavan that his organization had been in discussions with Sadr's representatives.

According to Raghavan's report on May 20, talks between Sadr's representatives and Sunni leaders, including leaders of Sunni armed resistance factions, first began in April.

Sadr's aides say he was encouraged to launch the new cross-sectarian initiative by the increasingly violent opposition from nationalist Sunni insurgents to the jihadists aligned with al Qaeda. One of his top aides, Ahmed Shaibani, recalled that the George W. Bush administration was arguing that a timetable was unacceptable because of the danger of al Qaeda taking advantage of a withdrawal. Shaibani told Raghavan that sectarian peace could be advanced if both Sadr's Mahdi Army and Sunni insurgent groups could unite to weaken al Qaeda.

Let's sit down for a moment and allow our heads to clear, shall we? While American citizens receive vague warnings about the possibility of domestic terror attacks perpetrated by a purportedly reinvigorated al-Qaeda, it turns out that indigenous Shia and Sunni resistance groups are already independently engaged in armed conflict with it! Furthermore, they are initiating dialogue about how they can work together to become even more effective in eradicating the al-Qaeda presence.

Indeed, according to the National Intelligence Estimate, the Shia and Sunni resistance are striking al-Qaeda in one of its strongholds that could faciliate a domestic terror attack:

We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to enhance its capabilities to attack the Homeland through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. Of note, we assess that al-Qa’ida will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack the Homeland. In addition, we assess that its association with AQI helps al-Qa’ida to energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks.

No doubt, the leaders of the Shia and Sunni resistance will soon be receiving counterterrorism grants from the Department of Homeland Security. It will, however, be necessary for them to strictly account for the expenditures of all funds to ensure that the monies are not diverted to anti-occupation operations aimed at US forces. With some good legal and accounting advice, this should not be too difficult.

Labels: "War on Terror", Al Qaeda, Iraqi Resistance, Muqtada al-Sadr, Occupation of Iraq

An amazing story by Patrick Cockburn in The Independent:

The US Army tried to kill or capture Muqtada al-Sadr, the widely revered Shia cleric, after luring him to peace negotiations at a house in the holy city of Najaf, which it then attacked, according to a senior Iraqi government official.

The revelation of this extraordinary plot, which would probably have provoked an uprising by outraged Shia if it had succeeded, has left a legacy of bitter distrust in the mind of Mr Sadr for which the US and its allies in Iraq may still be paying. "I believe that particular incident made Muqtada lose any confidence or trust in the [US-led] coalition and made him really wild," the Iraqi National Security Adviser Dr Mowaffaq Rubai'e told The Independent in an interview.

It is not known who gave the orders for the attempt on Mr Sadr but it is one of a series of ill-considered and politically explosive US actions in Iraq since the invasion. In January this year a US helicopter assault team tried to kidnap two senior Iranian security officials on an official visit to the Iraqi President. Earlier examples of highly provocative actions carried out by the US with little thought for the consequences include the dissolution of the Iraqi army and the Baath party.

The attempted assassination or abduction took place two-and-a-half years ago in August 2004 when Mr Sadr and his Mehdi Army militiamen were besieged by US Marines in Najaf, south of Baghdad.

Dr Rubai'e believes that his mediation efforts - about which he had given the US embassy, the American military command and the Iraqi government in Baghdad full details - were used as an elaborate set-up to entice the Shia leader to a place where he could be trapped.

The arrogance of such an action, if true, is remarkable. As noted by Pat Buchanan a few years ago, a President that presumes to target others for death makes himself vulnerable. But, of course, Bush is worth more to the cause of Political Islam alive than dead. No doubt, leaders like Sadr and Nasrallah find themselves frustrated by having to spend an inordinate amount of their time explaining it to their more passionate followers.

Labels: "War on Terror", Bush, Muqtada al-Sadr, Occupation of Iraq

In the US, the conventional perspective is that Iraq is now experiencing an irreversible civil war because the sectarian violence can no longer contained. Such a perspective conveniently fits within the domestic political narrative of blaming Iraqis for the failure of the occupation. Naturally, it ignores the fact that the US has, since its inception, manipulated tensions between Sunnis, Shia and Kurds, initially arming and training Shia police and militia to suppress the Sunni insurgency.

Unfortunately, despite their close relationship with their US advisors (or, perhaps, because of it?), it became impossible to distingush the armed Shia from death squads as they increasingly began killing, kidnapping and torturing their victims. Apparently, they were so successful that the US recently sought to expand the program into al-Anbar province by creating its own client Sunni militia to challenge the Sunni insurgency there. For more background, see my post of October 5, 2006, Negroponte's People.

There has, however, been one prominent figure in Iraq that has publicly opposed the occupation, the partition of the country and efforts to foment violence between the Sunni and the Shia. Of course, that person is Muqtada al-Sadr, the Iraqi politician most maligned in the US media, and he still persists, even in the face of the horrible violence that has erupted:

Last week, at least 215 people were killed in a series of car bombings in a Shiite slum of Baghdad, stronghold of the powerful Al Mahdi militia loyal to anti-American cleric Muqtada Sadr. The massive assault prompted days of reprisal attacks against Sunni neighborhoods.

Sadr demanded that Harith Dhari, the leader of the Muslim Scholars Assn. who is wanted on charges of inciting terrorism, issue edicts forbidding the killing of Shiites, banning participation in the group Al Qaeda in Iraq and supporting reconstruction of the Samarra shrine.

Dhari said he had already repeatedly denounced the killing of any Muslim and did not see the need to do so again. "Why is Sadr saying it now? Is he trying to provoke a problem?" Dhari asked The Times in a rare interview with a Western newspaper this week in neighboring Jordan.

He sidestepped the question of whether he is prepared to denounce Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is blamed for some of the deadliest attacks against the Shiite-led government and civilians.

"Al Qaeda is part of the resistance, but the resistance is of two kinds," he said, surrounded by tribal elders at a residence in Amman, the Jordanian capital. "The resistance that only resists occupation, this we support 100%. And the resistance that mixes up resisting the occupation and killing innocents … this, even if it calls itself resistance, we condemn."

Other clerics, particularly those living in areas dominated by Iraq's Shiite majority, see a pressing need for compromise. The tiny Sunni community in southern Iraq has been in disarray since the mufti of Basra, Yousuf Hassan, was assassinated in June, leaders said Wednesday.

Many Sunni clerics have fled the country. Those who remain said they wanted to signal a break with more radical leaders in Baghdad and Sunni-dominated Al Anbar province, heartland of the insurgency.

"We thought that what Muqtada Sadr set as conditions are not impossible," said Abdalfatah Abdalrazaq, a Basra imam. "All of them are aimed at preventing bloodshed."

After consulting local political and tribal leaders, the southern branch went ahead and issued its fatwa, or edict, including a specific ban on killing Shiites, language others have so far avoided.

"We did this to please God and our conscience," Abdalrazaq said. "We hope that we will be able to apply this fatwa to the reality on the ground, as it gives us a chance to live side by side with our brother, the Shiites, in the south."

Sadr's representatives in Basra welcomed the move.

"We think the Sunnis in the south are different in nature from the Sunnis in other regions," said Khalil Maliki, of Sadr's office. "Such a frank fatwa at this specific time will calm down all the violence in the south."

The story is revealing in many respects. First, it shows that, contrary to what you might think if you watched US television, prominent Shia and Sunni leaders still communicate with one another in an attempt to stop the violence. Second, while al-Sadr's outreach to the Muslim Scholars Assocation is nothing new, he's sought to create a coalition against the occupation including Sunni and Shia since its inception, the fact that he is still persisting is significant. Third, in a classic instance of Sherlock Holmes' observation about the dog that didn't bark, why isn't the US promoting such dialogue? Could it possibly be that the US doesn't want it to succeed because it presents the prospect of a unified Shia/Sunni front against the occupation?

Rhetorical questions aside, Sadr's effort is consistent with his recent decision to withdraw from the al-Maliki government:

Radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is building an anti-US parliamentary alliance to demand the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, some of his party's lawmakers have told AFP.

The 30-strong Sadrist bloc has suspended its support of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ruling coalition and withdrawn six ministers from cabinet in protest at the premier's meeting with US President George W. Bush.

Maliki on Thursday urged the group to end their boycott.

"I wish they would revise their decision as it is not a positive milestone in the political process," Maliki told reporters after he returned from Amman where he met Bush Thursday.

Earlier on Thursday, Salih al-Agaili, a member of Sadr's parliamentary group, said the bloc now hoped to persuade more lawmakers to follow their suspension, adding that some have "started contacting us to take a similar position. We are holding talks with them."

He did not name the groups but said they would soon declare their intentions. "We are endeavouring to form a national front inside parliament to oppose the occupation," Agaili said.

He stressed that the minimum condition for Sadrist deputies to rejoin the government would be "a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces."

Could it possibly be more obvious? We are endeavouring to form a national front inside parliament to oppose the occupation. In other words, there is an intense effort amongst Shia and Sunni to come together in an attempt to isolate, and eventually drive out, the US military and al-Qaeda, the two forces that Iraqis consider resposible for the conflagration has engulfed the country. If you still have doubt, consider the following, as it appears that the effort is gaining momentum:

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki faced a widening revolt within his divided government as two senior Sunni politicians joined prominent Shiite lawmakers and Cabinet members in criticizing his policies.

Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi said he wanted to see al-Maliki's government gone and another "understanding" for a new coalition put in place with guarantees that ensure collective decision making.

"There is a clear deterioration in security and everything is moving in the wrong direction," the Sunni leader told The Associated Press. "This situation must be redressed as soon as possible. If they continue, the country will plunge into civil war."

Al-Maliki's No. 2, Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zikam Ali al-Zubaie, also a Sunni, argued that the president's government failed to curb the spread of sectarian politics.

A boycott by 30 lawmakers and five Cabinet ministers loyal to anti-American Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr was in protest of al-Maliki's meeting with President Bush in Jordan on Thursday. The Sadrists said the meeting amounted to an affront to the Iraqi people.

Here's the Cliff Notes version: al-Maliki is a puppet of the US who supports a perpetual US occupation, and will do nothing to curtail that sectarian violence relied upon to justify it, so Iraqis want to be rid of him. Hence, the expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of collective decision making, as puppets installed to run client states aren't noted for their tendency to consult other domestic political leaders and act upon their advice.

Sadr is an essential figure in bringing about the creation of such a coalition. No wonder that two CNN hosts inquired of their American guests last weekend as to whether it was time to take out Sadr. Carol Costello and Wolf Blitzer were the culprits, with Blitzer's instance being the most illuminating :

BLITZER: Do you think -- I want to take a break, Senator Cornyn, but do you think it's enough for the U.S. or the Iraqi government to arrest Muqtada al-Sadr, this young Shiite cleric, or is it time to take him out as some are suggesting? In other words, kill him.

CORNYN [Republican Senator from Texas]: Well, I would say arrest him, and if he's unable to go peacefully, obviously I think he's a danger to the Iraqis and the Iraqi future in the entire Middle East. We need to disarm him and his militias. Arrest them.

Take them out of action whatever way we need to, and to provide basic security to allow the political process that Jack Reed and others have talked about to go forward. It's not going to do that in a period of such chaos and violence as we're seeing right now.

BLITZER: Senator Reed, kill him if necessary?

REED [Democratic Senator from Rhode Island]: I think what you -- that's a decision I think that the Iraqi government would make. But I think if he's -- an arrest warrant is authorized and they go after him, he resists, he becomes a combatant. I would hope we could get him off the scene without making him a martyr.

As with the war resolution, there was bipartisan consensus. Not much has changed since the November election. More generally, it reflects an attempt to Israelize the occupation of Iraq by adopting the policy of assassinating prominent political opponents, or targeted killings, as it is euphemistically called. But Cornyn and Reed were too cowardly to expressly adopt it, instead opting for an approach similar to the one that the Chicago police took with Fred Hampton. Let's provoke a firefight so that we can say that we had to kill him in self-defense. No doubt true fascists like Joshua Muravchik snorted in contempt.

Labels: Death Squads, Mainstream Media, Muqtada al-Sadr, Occupation of Iraq

Who could forget? Purported leftist Marc Cooper sanctimonously condemning advocates of an immediate withdrawal from Iraq as sacrificing Iraqis to a future of indiscriminate, exponentially increasing violence:

Those who ought to have the best answers, the anti-war movement, have none -- other than a discordant call for U.S. Troops Out Now. I sympathize with the quandary of the peace movement, because I pretend to have no viable answers. I know only that the present course is leading to disaster. And that withdrawal of U.S. troops – who shouldn’t be there in the first place—would bring only more bloodshed.

Read no further than this painfully distorted account of my position by Dennis Perrin to capture the moral tone-deafness of the radical left. Here we go once again withthe same-old primitive reductionism i.e. Opposing Immediate Withdrawal = Supporting Bush’s War.

Rather than face the ugly truth that things could actually get worse in Iraq if the current political vacuum were enlarged by an American withdrawal, it's easier to stand apart and accept an Iraqi apocalypse as satisfying payback for Bush's sins.

I challenge the "Out Now" readers to put themselves in the shoes of an Iraqi tonight as they read Perrin’s piece. Car bombs exploding around you like firecrackers and the streets running red with blood. Do you think that the wholesale murder by the car bombers –intent on rubbing out the tenuous Iraqi government—is going to decrease or increase if the American troops were pulled? Do you think that the people behind the bombs would establish a regime more humane, more democratic or, instead, even more authoritarian than the current U.S.-backed administration? You can keep your answers private, but at least ponder them seriously.

In the end, Perrin throws up his hands, declares that no matter what, the U.S. troops are destined to be bogged down Iraq forever, and that – to top things off—he argues that Iraq is worse than Vietnam.

The second assertion is demonstrably false, if only by the lesser magnitude of death in Iraq…a far lesser magnitude. War is evil. A war that kills 3 million people is more evil than one that kills 100,000. Or am I missing something? The whole formulation is beside the point. (Yet, there is some sort of wondrous political point to be scored by proving, say, that Bush is worse than Nixon. A game, by the way, we don't have the luxury to play).

The first assertion, about an indeterminate stay of the American troops is nevertheless and -- unfortunately -- quite plausible. And more than plausible, perhaps inevitable, especially if the anti-war left can do no better than propose immediate withdrawal. I find it extremely difficult to imagine that being a persuasive counter (at least for those who give a rat’s ass about the Iraqi people themselves) to the status quo.

Indeed, it’s a moral forfeit that cedes undue and dangerous credence to the Bush admin’s disastrous stay-the-course strategy.

We need a third position that moves toward an end of the U.S. occupation but does not, in the process, abandon the Iraqi people to car-bomber fascists.

It will be of little consequence to those blown apart by suicide-bound fanatics to stand over their corpses and say: “It’s all Bush’s fault. There was nothing we could do.”

As noted by Perrin in his passionate post, David Corn, perhaps a little more self-confident, and uninterested in establishing himself as the Christopher Hitchens of the West Coast, dealt with the problem more honestly:

All this does not mean it's wrong to call for withdrawing the troops. One can argue that Bush's war - pitched to the public with the phony arguments that Saddam Hussein's regime was loaded with WMDs and in cahoots with al Qaeda – does not deserve the life of one more American soldier, one more Iraqi civilian, or one more emergency spending bill. I'm sympathetic to that case. But those pushing for withdrawal have to acknowledge that a pullout may well come with serious costs. In the short run, those costs might include more violence in Iraq and a more out-in-the-open civil war that yields a terrible outcome.

Before the war, I and others argued that an invasion of Iraq could lead to a situation in which there would be no good options. That prediction has come true. Bush has created a mess that defies an obvious and low-cost solution. Military experts of late have been saying that the insurgency probably will last for years (perhaps decades) and that establishing an effective Iraqi security force could take five years or more. Yet Bush refuses to admit these realities. He has not told the public what his five-year (or fifteen-year) plan is. He has refused to discuss the price the American public will have to bear for his misguided war in Iraq. Withdrawal, though, would come with a price, too. It may be the best of lousy alternatives. But its advocates ought to acknowledge it is not cost-free. Unless they want to risk comparison to the fellow who started the war.

There might have been some surface plausibility to such views in the spring and summer of 2005, despite the fact that many Iraqis have been consistently blaming the presence of US troops for the escalating violence, as they did most recently over the bombing of the Imam Ali Al Hadi shrine in Samarra. But they have become increasing untenable in the face of persistent Iraqi support for resistance attacks on US/UK forces, as disclosed by British Ministry of Defense polling data revealed by the London Telegraph:

• Forty-five per cent of Iraqis believe attacks against British and American troops are justified - rising to 65 per cent in the British-controlled Maysan province;

• 82 per cent are "strongly opposed" to the presence of coalition troops;

• less than one per cent of the population believes coalition forces are responsible for any improvement in security;

• 67 per cent of Iraqis feel less secure because of the occupation;

• 43 per cent of Iraqis believe conditions for peace and stability have worsened;

• 72 per cent do not have confidence in the multi-national forces.

A recent UPI poll confirmed continuing strong Iraqi support for attacks on US/UK forces, while, understandably, reflecting opposition to ones directed at Iraqi governmental institutions and civilians, with Iraqis wanting US/UK troops withdrawn over a period ranging from 6 months to 2 years. One can infer that the Iraqis perceive the attacks as a necessary means of forcing the troops to the leave the country, as they also explicitly said, quite understandably, that they don't believe that the troops will ever depart. Even US troops themselves, in the absence of a stronger military commitment, have expressed approval of a withdrawal within a year.

Such results would appear to partially validate the Cooper/Corn perspective. But someone is paging them over the public address system: Marc Cooper and David Corn, there is a phone call for you, please go to one of the white courtesy phones in the lobby. Turns out Moqtada al-Sadr would like to speak with them to ask this question: to what end shall the troops remain? He's concerned because it doesn't appear that the protection of Iraqis is a priority for them in the future anymore than it has been in the past:

Rumsfeld previously had been reluctant to say what the US military would do in the event of civil war, but in an appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee he was pressed on the matter by Democratic Sen. Robert Byrd.

“The plan is to prevent a civil war, and to the extent one were to occur, to have the - from a security standpoint - have the Iraqi security forces deal with it, to the extent they are able to,” Rumsfeld told the committee.

Not surprisingly, Sadr, a consistent opponent of the occupation, responded angrily:

Sadr also criticised Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who had said last week that Iraqi troops, not U.S. forces, would intervene if civil war broke out in Iraq, JTW said.

"May God damn you," Sadr said of Rumsfeld. "You said in the past that civil war would break out if you were to withdraw, and now you say that in case of civil war you won't interfere."

Let's repeat that: You said in the past that civil war would break out if you were to withdraw, and now you say that in case of civil war you won't interfere.

Sounds familiar, doesn't it? Sounds kinda like what Cooper said back in the spring of 2005: We need a third position that moves toward an end of the U.S. occupation but does not, in the process, abandon the Iraqi people to car-bomber fascists. It will be of little consequence to those blown apart by suicide-bound fanatics to stand over their corpses and say: “It’s all Bush’s fault. There was nothing we could do."

At least, Rumsfeld's hypocrisy has the virtue of brevity. So, Sadr would like to talk with Marc and David about it, and ask them: why are the troops still in Iraq? Once they start talking, I'm sure that Sadr has some even more pointed questions, such as: Why are US troops doing the opposite of what the Iraqi people want, attacking the insurgents, while failing to protect us against suicide bombings? Why are they using drones to call in airstrikes that indiscriminately kill civilians to prevent roadside bombings of US troops without providing basic security for us?

I can imagine that Corn would engage in such a conversation candidly, but it would be difficult for Cooper. It would require him to acknowledge that, contrary to what he wrote in his blog entry, the anti-war movement, especially the left participants in it, have some pretty clear answers to these questions. Unfortunately, they are answers that he probably doesn't want to hear, as they involve references to things like oil, neoliberalism, imperialism and the inescapable relationship between militarism and capitalism, to explain that the presence of US troops in Iraq has never been about the protection of Iraqis.

Labels: Iraqi Resistance, Muqtada al-Sadr, Occupation of Iraq, Withdrawal